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Elizabeth A. Schartz *
I. INTRODUCTION
HE number of labor and employment actions brought in federal
court decreased again during the Survey period.1 In particular,
discrimination claims fell for the fourth year in a row-last year by
fifteen percent.2 Other new federal labor lawsuits, such as actions under
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), also declined. 3
Lawsuits under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") were a notable
exception to the overall downward trend. For the third year in a row,
those filings grew-last year by 4.2%. 4 Employment-law practitioners
will not be surprised. The FLSA remains perhaps the most frequently
misunderstood and violated federal labor law, even with the 2004 adop-
tion of regulations designed to simplify and clarify the act.5 Savvy plain-
tiffs' lawyers have discovered that the common payroll mistakes made by
employers can translate into readily settled FLSA collective actions.6
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1. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECrOR, 166, 167 (2006) (reporting on the num-
ber of civil cases commenced, by nature of suit, from 2002 to 2006).
2. Id. at 166 (reporting a 15.2% decrease in "civil rights employment suits").
3. Id. at 167 (reporting an overall decrease of 9.1% in federal labor law suits).
4. Id.
5. See 29 C.F.R. § 541; 69 Fed. Reg. 22260-22274 (Apr. 23, 2004).
6. BNA, Inc., Unions Speech by AFL-CIO General Counsel Jonathan Hiatt, DAILY
LABOR REPORT, Nov. 21, 2005, at E-5 (citing various studies to illustrate the "extraordi-
nary rates of noncompliance" with the FLSA); Assessing the Impact of the Labor Depart-
ment's Final Overtime Regulations on Workers & Employers: Hearing Before the Comm.
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Yet even as mediation and other forms of private alternative-dispute
resolution continue to siphon off much employment-law business from
public tribunals, federal and state courts continue to shape workplace




Retaliation law remains volatile. As the number of protected-category
discrimination s claims declined, retaliation claims increased-by more
than one-hundred percent over the course of the last decade. 9 Nearly
thirty percent of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
("EEOC") docket now consists of retaliation charges, 10 and the cost to
the employer of defending an average contested retaliation claim exceeds
$130,000 per case.11 Unsurprisingly then, the most important case de-
cided in the Survey period dealt with retaliation. 12
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,13 the Su-
preme Court ruled that a worker complaining of retaliation may recover
on Education and the Workforce, 108th Cong. 56 (2004) (statement of David S. Fortney,
labor and employment attorney) ("Wage and hour class actions now are the most fre-
quently filed class action claims employers face, and individual wage and hour lawsuits
doubled in 2002 .... [P]laintiffs' lawyers have discovered that the outdated regulations
provide an excellent basis for filing "gotcha" claims that primarily benefit the attorneys.")
(emphasis in original); Brooke A. Masters & Amy Joyce, Suits on Overtime Hitting Big
Firms: Employers Paying to Settle Many Cases, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 21, 2006, at D1
(reporting that plaintiffs' lawyers have discovered the money to be made in class-action
FLSA lawsuits).
7. The word "retaliation" does not appear in most federal and state employment
statutes. It is used to describe discrimination against employees who complain about, or
participate in proceedings involving, other kinds of discrimination prohibited by those
statutes. The more descriptive term for such claims is "protected-activity discrimination."
8. By "protected-category discrimination" we mean claims based on the characteris-
tics protected by the statute, such as race, sex, religion, age, or disability. Compare supra
nte 7.
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126
S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (No. 05-259) (citing statistics to illustrate the growth in retaliation
claims).
10. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, CHARGE STATISTICS:
FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2006 (2007) (reporting that in 2006, retaliation cases made up,
alone or in combination with protected-category discrimination claims, 29.8% of all
charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")).
11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126
S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (No. 05-259) (explaining to the Supreme Court why its ruling on a retali-
ation claim will have a dramatic impact).
12. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Weigh Whether Railroad Retaliated Against
Worker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2006, at A24; Toni Locy, High Court Hears Case on Retalia-
tion at Work, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 18, 2006, at A9; Charles Lane, Court Expands
Right to Sue Over Retaliation on the Job, WASHINGTON POST, June 23, 2006, at A16; Page
Rockwell, The Supreme Court vs. Discrimination, SALON.COM, June 22, 2006, at http://
www.salon.com/mwt/broadsheet/2006/06/22/scotus/index.html; All Things Considered. Su-
preme Court Hears Workplace Retaliation Case, (NPR radio broadcast Apr. 17, 2006),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5346783&ft=l&f=1001.
13. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
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money damages even if she did not suffer a tangible adverse action (one
that causes economic loss) or experience a "hostile working environ-
ment" as previously defined by the Court. 14 Instead, an employee need
only prove a "materially adverse" employment action-an action that
"well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or support-
ing a charge of discrimination.' 15
1. Facts
Shelia White was a track laborer working out of a Burlington Northern
& Santa Fe ("BNSF") rail yard. She mainly operated a forklift in the
yard but also performed ordinary track laborer work. After she com-
plained about sexual harassment, she was taken off forklift duty and as-
signed regular track laborer work full time. Later her supervisor
suspended her without pay for insubordination. The union grieved on
her behalf, and higher management rescinded the suspension, reinstated
her, and gave her backpay for the thirty-seven days she was suspended.
She challenged both the change in work duties and the suspension as
retaliatory.
2. Issue
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision forbids an employer from discrimi-
nating against an employee or job applicant because that person opposed
other prohibited discrimination.16 The circuit courts were split over the
scope of that provision, particularly the meaning of the phrase "discrimi-
nate against. ' 17 In White, the Supreme Court had to resolve this issue:
how harmful must an action be to be cognizable under Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision? 18
3. Holding
The Court held that the retaliation provision "covers those (and only
those) employer actions that would be materially adverse to a reasonable
employee or job applicant."' 9 "[T]hat means," the Court explained, "that
the employer's actions must be harmful to the point that they could well
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of dis-
crimination. '20 As for White's situation, the Court found that both tem-
porarily suspending her (even though the unpaid suspension was later
rescinded with full backpay) and requiring her to perform on a full-time
basis, the more physically demanding parts of her job duties could be
illegal retaliation.2'
14. Id. at 2415.
15. Id. at 2409.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2007); see supra note 7.
17. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2410.
18. Id. at 2408.
19. Id. at 2409.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2416-18.
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White's holding merges elements of the test prevailing before White-
requiring that an action be materially adverse 22-and a standard adopted
by the EEOC and approved only by the Ninth Circuit. In the EEOC's
view, an employee need only point to "adverse treatment that is reasona-
bly likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected
activity. ' 23 The test the Supreme Court adopted is narrower because the
EEOC's proposed standard did not require that the employment action
be "materially adverse. '2 4 Without the requirement of "material adver-
sity," the Supreme Court feared that employees could recover for "trivial
harms," "petty slights," and "minor annoyances. '25 The Supreme Court's
opinion thus at least pays lip service to employers' concern that claims
might be based purely on assertions of intangible harms.26
The Court's test, however, is problematic. While the Court stressed the
need for an objective standard, it also said that "objectivity" includes tak-
ing into account the particular circumstances of the plaintiff.27 Similarly
left unclear is how "trivial," "petty," and "minor" impacts on employees
can be distinguished from "materially adverse" events. Finally, the Court
rejected the argument pressed by BNSF and the Solicitor General that
the test for adverse action should be the same for retaliation and pro-
tected-category discrimination claims, thus leaving entirely open the
question of what impact on an employee must be shown for the latter
type of claims.28 Consequently, as seemingly often happens when the
Court takes up employment-law issues, White may well have created
more questions for future litigants than it provided answers. 29
4. Non-employment Retaliation
White also addressed whether Title VII's anti-retaliation provision con-
fines actionable retaliation to activities that affect the terms and condi-
tions of employment. 30 The answer is no: "The scope of the anti-
retaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related or employment-
related retaliatory acts and harm."'31 But nobody in the case had asked
the question. White did not claim that BNSF retaliated against her in any
fashion unrelated to her job. Why the Court reached out to decide the-
issue anyway is a puzzle. In any event, the effect of the ruling is not likely
to be widespread, as non-employment-related retaliation claims are
22. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 796-800 (6th Cir. 2004)
(en banc).
23. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2411 (quoting Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
24. Id. at 2415.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2415-16.
27. Id. at 2415, 2417.
28. Id. at 2411-14.
29. Id. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 2408, 2411.




5. White's Reach and Some Unanswered Questions
a. What conduct is actionable under Title VII's substantive discrimina-
tion provision? As noted, because White is limited to retaliation cases, it
did not resolve the longstanding circuit split over what impact an employ-
ment action must have to constitute actionable protected-category dis-
crimination. Consequently, a discrimination plaintiff in a comparatively
pro-employee circuit may successfully sue over employment actions that,
in another circuit, may be considered too trivial to be actionable. 33 For
Texas practitioners, the standard for non-retaliation claims continues to
be the, ultimate-employment-decision standard set out in Mattern v. East-
man Kodak Co. ,34 under which only final decisions such as hiring, grant-
ing leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating are actionable. 35
b. Does White's holding apply to other federal anti-retaliation stat-
utes? Although White considered only Title VII's anti-retaliation provi-
sion, its holding already has been extended beyond Title VII cases.
Federal courts have borrowed White's standard when interpreting anti-
retaliation provisions found in other federal employment statutes, such as
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 36 Rehabilitation Act, 37
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"),38 Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act ("FMLA"),39 §1981,40 § 1983,41 and even a state-law work-
ers' compensation statute.42
32. See Bryan P. Neal & Andrea Hyatt, It's a Brave New World: Retaliation Claims
after Burlington Northern & Santa Fe v. White (manuscript at 33) (May 2, 2007) (manu-
script presented at the Defense Research Institute's May 2007 Employment Law Seminar)
(on file with the SMU Law Review).
33. See generally LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 12.01 (2006) (dis-
cussing the circuit courts' different standards for Title VII discrimination suits).
34. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997).
35. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707; see, e.g., Pryor v. Wolfe, 196 F. App'x 260, 263 (5th Cir.
2006) (applying the "ultimate employment decision" analysis to plaintiff's discrimination
claim); Dixon v. Moore Wallace, Inc., 2006 WL 1949501, at *8 n.13 (N.D. Tex. July 13,
2006) (applying the "ultimate employment decision" analysis to plaintiff's discrimination
claim and noting that "because it does not appear that the holdings or reasoning of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in [White] alters Fifth Circuit precedent concerning Title
VII discrimination, as opposed to retaliation, jurisprudence, the court need not address the
impact of that decision on today's case.").
36. See, e.g., Cassimy v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.3d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 2006).
37. See, e.g., Ryan v. Shawnee Mission Unified Sch. Dist., No. 05-2213-JWL, 2006 U.S.
Dist., at *25 (D. Kan. Aug. 25, 2006).
38. See, e.g., McInnis v. Town of Weston, 98 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1582, 1587
(D. Conn. 2006).
39. See, e.g., Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 464 F.3d 1164, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir.
2006).
40. See, e.g., Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 403-04 (7th Cir. 2007); Woo-
ten v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 3:04-CV-1196-D, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2195, at *59 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 9, 2007).
41. See Wrobel v. County of Erie, 211 F. App'x 71, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2007).
42. See Hoshak v. Sysco Food Servs., LLC, No. 2:06CV176, 2006 WL 2945357, at *6
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2006).
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c. Is the new "materially adverse employment action" standard a ques-
tion for the judge or jury? White is silent about whether a judge or jury
should decide if an employment action is materially adverse. No court
has yet answered this question.43
d. Is the employee's post-retaliation conduct relevant? That White's
new standard is both objective and contextual poses another question: If
an employee continues to complain about discrimination even after she
allegedly suffered retaliation, is that evidence-or even conclusive
proof-that she did not suffer a materially adverse employment action
given that the allegedly retaliatory acts evidently did not deter further
complaints? Courts have taken conflicting views.44
6. Fallout from White
White has not yet resulted in a deluge of jury trials on retaliation claims
as many had predicted after the Court decided the case. The materiality
requirement has allowed lower courts to continue dismissing many claims
involving insubstantial harms. Courts have also used White's "objective"
standard to weed out claims brought by hypersensitive employees based
on employment actions that would not deter a reasonable employee from
protected activity. 45
B. POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
The Texas Supreme Court's long-awaited decision in Alex Sheshunoff
Management Services L.P. v. Johnson46 makes it easier for Texas employ-
ers to enforce covenants-not-to-compete. After Johnson, employers that
provide sensitive information or specialized training in return for an em-
ployee's agreement to maintain .the information or knowledge gained
from training in confidence can enforce a restriction on post-employment
competition. The restriction must be "reasonable," and the employer
must provide the confidential information or specialized training before
the employee departs.47
43. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the issue, but resolved the case on other grounds.
See Shohadaee v. Metro Gov't of Nashville, 150 F. App'x 402, 403 (6th Cir. 2005).
44. Compare Johnson v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 451 F. Supp. 2d 681, 711 (W.D. Pa. 2006)
(holding that employee's post-complaint conduct was irrelevant), with DeHart v. Baker
Hughes Oilfield Operations, 89 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,659 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding
that an employee's post-complaint conduct in continuing to complain was relevant to show
that employee did not suffer a materially adverse employment action), and Sykes v. Pa.
State Police, 2007 WL 141064, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2007) ("Sykes's vigorous and re-
peated use of all available means to supplement, expand, and pursue allegations of discrim-
ination destroys the second element of her prima facie retaliation claim.").
45. See Neal & Hyatt, supra note 32 (manuscript at 11-59) (evaluating White's impact
on retaliation litigation).
46. 209 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. 2006).




Kenneth Johnson worked for a consulting firm. In 1997, he was pro-
moted to a director-level position and presented with an employment
agreement. The agreement stated that during his employment, the firm
would provide him with confidential information, which Johnson agreed
to keep strictly confidential. The agreement included a one-year cove-
nant-not-to-compete.
Johnson signed the agreement and later received highly confidential
information about a new product the company was developing. He then
defected to a rival consulting firm. His former employer filed suit to stop
Johnson from violating the noncompete agreement. 48
2. Background
The Covenants Not to Compete Act requires that a noncompete
agreement:
1. be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at
the time the agreement is made; and
2. contain limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of
activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do not impose a
greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other
business interest of the promisee.49
In Light v. Centel Cellular Co.,5° the Texas Supreme Court held that for
a covenant to be "ancillary to or part of" an otherwise enforceable agree-
ment, "(1) the consideration given by the employer in the otherwise en-
forceable agreement must give rise to the employer's interest in
restraining the employee from competing; and (2) the covenant must be
designed to enforce the employee's consideration or return promise in
the otherwise enforceable agreement. '51 Johnson did not disturb that
holding.
But in footnote 6, the Light court emphasized the need for a noncom-
pete to be ancillary to or part of an "otherwise enforceable agreement at
the time the agreement is made."' 52 The supreme court reasoned that a
mere promise by the employer to provide confidential information or
specialized training is "illusory" in the at-will context because the em-
ployer could simply fire the employee without handing over the informa-
tion or providing the training.53 To be sure, the "unilateral" promise by
the employee in the typical noncompete-to safeguard, not disclose, and
return upon separation the employer's confidential information-can be
accepted by the employer's performance in providing the information or
training, thereby turning the unilateral promise into a binding agreement.
48. Id. at 646-48 (laying out the factual background for the case).
49. TEx Bus. & CoM. CODE §§ 15.50(a) (Vernon 1987).
50. 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994).
51. Id. at 647.




But acceptance of the employee's promise by the employer's later per-
formance did not retroactively make the agreement enforceable "at the
time the agreement [was] made. ' 54 As a result, some lower courts read
Light to require the employer not just to promise to provide confidential
information or specialized training during employment, but to actually
hand over the information or give the training at the instant the employee
signed the agreement. 55
Arguably, those courts misread Light. They overlooked that a promise
to provide information is illusory only if it is dependent on continued
employment. In theory, an employer could promise to provide confiden-
tial information to an at-will employee without regard to the period of
employment. That is, an employer could make a promise that obligated it
to provide information to the employee even if the employer, as feared
by Light, fired the employee just after she signed the agreement. There is
no apparent reason why that approach would not create a non-illusory,
bilateral agreement binding at the time the agreement is made. But, the
promise in Johnson was in fact dependent on Johnson's employment, so
the supreme court had to address whether it was enforceable.
3. Johnson's Holding
Johnson parted ways with Light over footnote 6, "insofar as it pre-
cludes a unilateral contract made enforceable by performance from ever
complying with the Act because it was not enforceable at the time it was
made. '56 The Johnson court held that "a unilateral contract formed when
the employer performs a promise that was illusory when made can satisfy
the requirements of the Act."'57 When the consulting firm later per-
formed its promise by giving Johnson confidential information, the agree-
ment became non-illusory at that moment and retroactively validated
Johnson's earlier undertaking not to compete. 58
4. A Return to Reason
Johnson is good news for employers seeking to enforce noncompete
agreements. In addition to its specific holding, the Texas Supreme Court
criticized the "overly technical disputes that [its] opinion in Light seems
to have engendered over whether a covenant is ancillary to an otherwise
enforceable agreement. '59 The supreme court urged instead a return to
the Act's "core inquiry": whether the noncompete is reasonable. 60
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Trilogy Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 143 S.W. 3d 452, 461 &
n.6 (Tex. App.-Austin, 2004, pet. filed) (refusing to enforce a noncompete because the
employer did not provide the employee with the promised confidential information "im-
mediately upon" the employee's signing of the noncompete; instead, the employer pro-
vided the confidential information later that day).
56. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d at 651.
57. Id.
58. Id.





Despite Johnson, Texas noncompete law remains well outside the juris-
prudential mainstream in the United States.61 For example, in spite of its
observations about technical disputes, Johnson left in place Light's two
other broad technicalities-the "give rise to" and "designed to enforce"
requirements. Because of those remaining requirements-neither of
which can be found in the statute-employer promises to provide money,
at-will employment, and advance notice of an employee's discharge still
are not valid consideration for a covenant-not-to-compete in Texas.
62
Compared with most other states, then, far more Texas disputes about
noncompetes still will be short-circuited without inquiry into the core
"reasonableness" question.
A pair of Texas appellate cases illustrate another obstacle employers
face when trying to enforce post-employment restrictive covenants: by
the time the case is heard, the damage to the employer's business is al-
ready done. In RenewData Corp. v. Strickler,63 the employee's one-year
noncompete agreement had expired by the time the case reached the
Austin Court of Appeals, so the court declared the issue moot.
64 Of
course, that problem can be remedied by simply drafting the covenant to
automatically extend the restrictive time period during periods of breach.
In The Reach Group v. The Angelina Group,6 5 the employer was una-
ble to obtain an injunction against two employees who defected from the
company and then started raiding its clients, in violation of their noncom-
pete and nonsolicitation agreements. 66 The Houston Court of Appeals
for the Fourteenth District ruled that an injunction was not appropriate
because the company could wait for an adequate remedy at law-mone-
tary damages for any business that it lost to the two defecting employ-
ees.67 This case also serves as a cautionary tale about preparing witnesses
61. See M. Scott McDonald, Symposium: The Role of Contract in the Modern Employ-
ment Relationship: Compete Contracts: Understanding The Cost of Unpredictability 10
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137, 146 (2003) (criticizing Light for creating "a great deal of
unpredictability and an 'all or nothing' result in many cases"); Gary Fowler, Drafting Effec-
tive Noncompetition Covenants: the Incredible Darkness of Light v. Centel Cellular (Aug.
19, 2002) at 1-1 (on file with the SMU Law Review) ("[H]ardly any one can understand
Light. As a result, practitioners have struggled with drafting enforceable noncompetition
covenants because the Light standards are artificial and not intuitive.") (emphasis in
original).
62. See, e.g., Strickland v. Medtronic, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003, pet. dism'd) (holding that the employer did not provide valid consideration for a
noncompete agreement by promising an at-will employee that it would give her (1) ninety
days notice prior to discharge, and (2) compensate her in the event of economic hardship
resulting from the non-compete agreement).
63. No. 03-05-00273-CV, 2006 WL 504998 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 3, 2006, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication).
64. Id. at 838 (ruling that the "covenant's enforceability" under Texas statutory law
was "moot").
65. 173 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
66. Id. at 835-36.
67. Id. at 838 (holding that an injunction was unwarranted because the company had
"an adequate remedy at law").
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to testify; damaging admissions from the company's own representative
destroyed the company's chances of getting an injunction.68
III. NOTEWORTHY CASES
A. JURISDICTION
The United States Supreme Court decided whether an employee
numerosity requirement in a federal labor statute is an issue of federal-
court subject-matter jurisdiction or an element of the employee's claim
for relief. That issue arises because federal labor laws typically exempt
small employers from coverage by defining the term "employer" to in-
clude only employers with a minimum number of employees.69 For ex-
ample, Title VII defines a covered "employer" as one having "fifteen or
more employees. ' 70 In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,71 the Supreme Court
held that "the threshold number of employees for application of Title VII
is an element of a plaintiff's claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue. '72
To decide the case, the Supreme Court adopted a "readily administrable
bright line": unless Congress clearly states that a threshold limitation on
a statute's scope is jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as
nonjurisdictional. 73 Applying Arbaugh, lower courts held that employee
numerosity requirements in the FMLA and ADEA were also
nonjurisdictional.74
B. ARBITRATION
Both federal and state courts continue to resolve doubts in favor of
arbitration. In federal court, the Fifth Circuit ruled that claims filed
under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights
Act ("USERRA") are subject to arbitration under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.75 A Texas district court held that a collective bargaining agree-
ment can in some circumstances effectively waive an employee's right to
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2007) (limiting coverage of Title VII by defining
"employer" as including only those having "fifteen or more employees"); 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (2006) (limiting coverage of the ADEA by defining "employer" as including only
those having "twenty or more employees"); cf 29 U.S.C. §2611(2)( B)( ii) (2006) (limiting
coverage of the FMLA by using a definition of "employee" that requires the employee to
work for an employer with a certain number of employees).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2007) (defining "employer").
71. 126 S. Ct. 1235 (2006).
72. Id. at 1245.
73. Id.
74. Minard v. ITC Delta Commc'ns, Inc., 447 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Applying
the Supreme Court's Arbaugh bright line rule here, we conclude that the threshold number
of employees for application of the FMLA is an element of a plaintiff's claim for relief, not
a jurisdictional limitation."); Simmons v. Harrison Waldrop & Uhereck, L.L.P., No. V-05-
71, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23319, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2006) (applying Arbaugh's rule
and concluding that the ADEA's employee-numerosity requirement was
nonjurisdictional).
75. Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 681 (5th Cir. 2006).
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a federal forum for discrimination suits. 76
In state court, the Texas Supreme Court approved the common em-
ployment practice of providing employees with a summary of the com-
pany's arbitration policy rather than the policy itself.77 A summary is
enough to bind the employee, the supreme court ruled, provided it (1)
unequivocally notifies the employee that arbitration will be required for
resolving covered claims and (2) specifically describes which claims are
covered.78
Dillard Department Stores had its arbitration policy challenged three
times in as many years and prevailed on each occasion, in federal and
state court. 79 In one case, Dillard successfully compelled arbitration of
the employee's claims even though the employee protested that she never
agreed to the arbitration policy and never signed a copy of the arbitration
acknowledgment form.80 The Texas Supreme Court concluded that there
was enough circumstantial evidence to compel a finding that the em-
ployee received the acknowledgement form and kept working for Dillard,
which was all that was necessary to bind her.81 In another challenge to
Dillard's policy, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the policy's coverage
of "personal injuries" was broad enough to include coverage of the em-
ployee's defamation claim.8 2
Two other courts gave similarly broad interpretations to arbitration
agreements in situations where the employee's claims arose outside the
time the employee actually worked for the employer.
First, in Gray v. Sage Telecom, Inc.,83 the employee alleged that after
she left the company, her former employer thwarted her efforts to find a
new job. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas ruled that her claim fell within the scope of the arbitration policy
she had agreed to while working for the company because the policy ex-
plicitly covered any employment-related claim brought by "former em-
76. Martinez v. Asset Prot. & Sec. Servs., L.P., No. B-05-241, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27553, at *12 (S.D. Tex. May 9, 2006).
77. In re Dallas Peterbilt, Ltd., 196 S.W.3d 161, 162-63 (Tex. 2006).
78. Id. at 163; see also Nabors Drilling USA, LP v. Carpenter, 198 S.W.3d 240, 247-49
(Tex. App-San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (rejecting employee's objections that an arbitra-
tion agreement was unenforceable because (1) it did not specifically state that the arbitra-
tion was "binding," and (2) the employer retained a qualified right to amend or end the
arbitration program).
79. Marino v. Dillard's Inc., 413 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 2005) (compelling arbitration
pursuant to Dillard's arbitration policy); In re Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 778,
782 (Tex. 2006) (same); In re Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tex. 2006)
(same).
80. In re Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 198 S.W.3d at 780 (compelling arbitration pursuant
to Dillard's arbitration policy, despite employee's objection that she never agreed to the
policy).
81. Id.
82. In re Dillard Dep't Stores, 186 S.W.3d at 516 (reasoning that the employee's defa-
mation claim fell within the arbitration policy's coverage of "personal injuries" because
defamation is a personal injury to reputation).




ployees. ''8 4 Second, in Wachovia Securities, LLC v. Emery,85 a broker
accused the firm's manager of making false, material misrepresentations
to lure him away from his previous job and join the firm. The Houston
Court of Appeals for the First District ruled that the brokerage firm's
arbitration policy was broad enough to cover the broker's suit, even
though the alleged misrepresentation occurred before the broker joined
the firm and signed the arbitration policy.8 6
C. DISCRIMINATION & RETALIATION
1. Evidence of Discrimination
Could a manager's reference to African-American subordinates as
"boy," without any racial modifiers such as "black" or "white," be evi-
dence of discriminatory intent? Last year, the Supreme Court answered,
"of course."'87 In Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., two African-American men
worked as superintendents at a poultry plant in Alabama.88 They
claimed that they were denied promotions because of their race.89 Ty-
son's plant manager, who made the decision not to promote the two men,
had referred to each of them as "boy" 90 on several occasions. The men
argued that his use of the term "boy" was evidence of discriminatory ani-
mus. 91 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that "while the use of
boy when modified by a racial classification like black or white is evi-
dence of discriminatory intent, the use of boy alone is not evidence of
discrimination. '92 The Supreme Court criticized the Eleventh Circuit for
being too hasty in assuming that the term "boy," by itself, was not racist:
Although it is true the disputed word will not always be evidence of
racial animus, it does not follow that the term, standing alone, is al-
ways benign. The speaker's meaning may depend on various factors
including context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and histori-
cal usage. Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that modifiers or
qualifications are necessary in all instances to render the disputed
term probative of bias, the court's decision is erroneous.93
The Fifth Circuit also considered a case dealing with discriminatory re-
marks. In Jones v. Robinson Property Group,94 the plaintiff, an African-
American, pointed to comments by the casino's management that indi-
cated race played a role in selecting poker dealers. Specifically, one for-
mer poker dealer for the casino testified that the poker-room manager
84. Gray, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 510-11.
85. 186 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
86. Id. at 113-14.
87. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1195, 1197 (2006).
88. Id. at 1196.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1197.
91. Id.
92. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App'x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal citation
omitted), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1195 (2006).
93. Ash, 126 S. Ct. at 1197.
94. 427 F.3d 987 (5th Cir. 2005).
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confided in him that he had been "told not to hire too many blacks in the
poker room."'95 Another poker dealer for the casino testified that, when
she asked why a certain female African-American applicant was not
hired, she was told, by either the poker-room manager or his assistant,
that "they hired who they wanted to hire and they were not going to hire
a black person unless there were extenuating circumstances," and that
"good old white boys don't want blacks touching their cards in their
face."' 96 That testimony was sufficiently specific to constitute direct evi-
dence of discrimination. 97 It was true that the one dealer could not re-
member whether the poker-room manager or his assistant made the
racist comments, but because both men were involved in hiring decisions,
it did not matter which one actually uttered the racist words. 98
2. Judging Qualifications
When deciding failure-to-hire (or failure-to-promote) cases, courts
often have used a vivid phrase to describe how difficult it is for a plaintiff
to prove pretext merely by asserting that she was more qualified than the
successful candidate. The disparity in qualifications must be so apparent,
the courts pronounced, "virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the
face."99 The Supreme Court took umbrage at that phrase in Ash v. Tyson
Foods: "The visual image of words jumping off the page to slap you (pre-
sumably a court) in the face is unhelpful and imprecise as an elaboration
of the standard for inferring pretext from superior qualifications." 10 0 The
Supreme Court did not propose a substitute phrasing, but it did note with
approval that three different circuits have managed to articulate the stan-
dard without stirring up violent images of slapped judges. 10 1
3. Scope of Administrative Charge
In a case of first impression, the Fifth Circuit considered whether an




98. Id. at 992-93.
99. See, e.g., Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added)
overruled in part by Ash v. Tyson Foods, 126 S. Ct. 1195, 1197 (2006); Bernales v. County of
Cook, 37 F. App'x 792, 795 (7th Cir. 2002); Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1187
(11th Cir. 2001); Lee v. GTE Fla., Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2000); Bullington v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1319 (10th Cir. 1999); Deines v. Tex. Dep't of Protec-
tive & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1999) (all articulating the standard
using some variation of the phrase "jump off the page and slap you in the face").
100. Id. at 1197.
101. Id. at 1197-98 (letting the opportunity pass "to define more precisely what stan-
dard should govern pretext claims" and instead pointing to three acceptable alternatives
from the circuit courts). For example, the Ninth Circuit articulates the standard in a per-
fectly tame way: "qualifications evidence standing alone may establish pretext where the
plaintiff's qualifications are clearly superior to those of the selected job applicant." Ash,




rate-impact claim.' 02 To answer the question, the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered: "What facts in an administrative charge might be reasonably
expected to trigger an EEO disparate-impact investigation? ' 10 3 The Fifth
Circuit held that in the case before it, the employee's EEOC charge could
not reasonably have prompted the EEOC to investigate disparate-impact
discrimination because "(1) it facially alleged disparate treatment; (2) it
identified no neutral employment policy; and (3) it complained of past
incidents of disparate treatment only."' 01 4 The Fifth Circuit cautioned,
however, that its holding does not require a Title VII plaintiff to (1)
"check a certain box or recite a specific incantation" to comply with ad-
ministrative preconditions to suit, or (2) state a prima facie case of dispa-
rate-impact discrimination before the EEOC. 0 5
In another case involving administrative prerequisites to suit, the Fifth
Circuit joined the Second and Fourth Circuits in holding that employees
who file their own Title VII actions that are later consolidated with an
earlier filed case may not "piggyback" on an EEOC charge filed by the
plaintiff in the original suit. 10 6 To hold otherwise would impermissibly
expand the "single-filing rule. 10 7
In a different dispute over the scope of an employee's administrative
charge, a Texas court of appeals took the rare approach of interpreting
chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code10 8 differently than Title VII. 10 9 The
issue was whether the filing of an administrative complaint is mandatory
and jurisdictional under chapter 21 even though, under federal law, the
filing of an EEOC charge is not a jurisdictional requirement. The Texas
court "decline[d] to be guided by federal law on this issue" and ruled that
chapter 21's administrative-exhaustion requirement is "mandatory and
jurisdictional."'1 0 As such, the employee's failure to assert retaliation in
her EEOC charge deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction
over her retaliation claim."1
102. Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2006).
103. Id. at 789-90.
104. Id. at 792.
105. Id.
106. Price v. Choctaw Glove & Safety Co., 459 F.3d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding
that "individuals filing separate Title VII suits that are later consolidated may not
piggyback").
107. The single-filing rule is a limited exception to the requirement that a plaintiff file
an EEOC charge before suing under Title VII and other federal statutes. It permits a
person who has not filed a charge to opt-in to a suit filed by any similarly situated plaintiff
who filed an EEOC charge so long as the charge provided some notice of the collective or
class-wide nature of the charge. Price, 459 F.3d at 598-99.
108. Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code formerly was known as the Texas Commis-
sion on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"). See Little v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 148
S.W.3d 374, 377-78 (Tex. 2004) (describing the abolition of the Commission on Human
Rights and the Texas Supreme Court's preferred terminology for the former TCHRA).
Some courts, however, continue to use the term "TCHRA."
109. El Paso County v. Navarrete, 194 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006, pet.
denied) (acknowledging that, in general, Texas courts look to federal law on Title VII when
interpreting chapter 21).
110. Id. at 682.
111. Id. at 683-84.
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4. Burdens of Proof in Disparate-Impact Cases
Under Title VII, an employer may use policies that have a disparate
impact on a protected group if (1) that policy is job related and consistent
with business necessity, and (2) there is no equally effective "alternative
employment practice" that the employer could use that would not have
the disparate impact. 1 2 The question that has divided the circuit courts is
this: Who bears the burden of proving whether there is a nondiscrimina-
tory and equally effective alternative employment practice? 113 The Fifth
Circuit weighed in on that debate and held that the plaintiff has the bur-
den of demonstrating evidence of acceptable alternative practices.11 4 In
that case, the employer required an applicant to have a certain score on a
written aptitude test to qualify for a clerical position. The requirement
had an undeniable disparate impact on African-Americans.1 1 5 Neverthe-
less, the plaintiff, a union, lost the case because it did not present any
proof that there was an equally effective and nondiscriminatory alterna-
tive to the employer's use of the cutoff score.11 6
5. Sexual Harassment
The Fifth Circuit clarified that the correct test in a sexual-harassment
case is whether the harassment was "severe or pervasive"-not "severe
and pervasive."" 7 The Fifth Circuit explained why the distinction
matters:
[T]he requirement that a plaintiff establish that reported abusive
conduct be both severe and pervasive in order to be actionable im-
poses a more stringent burden on the plaintiff than required by law.
The Supreme Court has stated that isolated incidents, if egregious,
can alter the terms and conditions of employment. By contrast,
under a conjunctive standard, infrequent conduct, even if egregious,
would not be actionable because it would not be "pervasive."' 1 8
Applying that disjunctive standard to the case before it, the Fifth Circuit
ruled that a jury could conclude that the plaintiff was subjected to severe
or pervasive harassment by a male co-worker.1 19 During a seven-month
period, the harasser grabbed the woman and "kissed her on the cheek,
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)( 1)( A)( i), (ii) (2000).
113. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Eng'rs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 442 F.3d 313, 318 n.10 (5th
Cir. 2006) (citing circuit court cases that have ruled on the issue of which party bears the
burden of demonstrating acceptable alternative business practice evidence).
114. Miss. Power & Light Co., 442 F.3d at 317 ("[T]he burden of demonstrating accept-
able alternative business practice evidence is one that rests upon Title VII plaintiffs, not
defendants.").
115. Id. at 319 (observing that the employer did not deny that the cutoff score had a
disparate impact).
116. Id. (concluding that the employee union did not overcome the employer's demon-
stration of business necessity because it "failed to provide any meaningful showing of ac-
ceptable alternative employment practices").
117. 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005). The Fifth Circuit admitted that it had been guilty
of "inconsistent application of the severe or pervasive standard" itself. Id. at 435.
118. Id. at 435 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
119. Id. at 436-37.
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popped rubber bands at her breasts, fondled her breasts numerous times,
patted her on her buttocks numerous times, . . . rubbed his body against
her," and commented on her sex life and sexual abilities.
120
6. Disability-Failure to Accommodate
The Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana State University violated the
ADA by too hastily discharging a librarian who was losing her vision.
121
When the librarian's failing eyesight started to interfere with her job du-
ties, the university's ADA coordinator met with the librarian to discuss
possible accommodations. The librarian confessed that she could not
think of any accommodation that would enable her to continue working,
so the ADA coordinator discharged her.12 2 According to the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the ADA coordinator jumped the gun: "An employer may not
stymie the interactive process of identifying a reasonable accommodation
for an employee's disability by preemptively terminating the employee
before an accommodation can be considered or recommended. 1 23 The
university's ADA coordinator knew that (1) the librarian had just met
with a vocational-rehabilitation counselor to get help in finding a possible
accommodation, and (2) the librarian wanted to keep working. Those
two facts triggered the university's obligation to participate in an interac-
tive process with the librarian to attempt to identify a reasonable accom-
modation, even if the librarian had not yet determined what kind of
accommodation might be workable. 124
7. Disability-Regarded as Disabled
The Fifth Circuit also reversed a summary judgment for ConAgra in a
disability discrimination case under chapter 21.125 The company offered
Rudy Rodriguez a permanent job as a Production Utility employee at its
plant, contingent on Rodriguez's passing a physical exam administered by
the company's doctor, who was to assess Rodriguez's medical qualifica-
tion for the Production Utility position. But ConAgra had never given
the doctor information about or restrictions applicable to the position, so
when the doctor examined Rodriguez he did not know a thing about
Rodriguez's job offer or the qualifications necessary for the Production
Utility position.126 Among other tests, the doctor performed a standard
urinalysis on Rodriguez, which showed an elevated concentration of glu-
120. Id. at 435-46. Although the plaintiff proved she had been sexually harassed, she
ultimately lost her suit because she unreasonably failed to take advantage of corrective
opportunities provided by her employer and, once the employer learned about the harass-
ment, it took swift remedial measures to end it. Id. at 437-39.




125. Rodriguez v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 436 F.3d 468, 484 (5th Cir. 2006) (criti-
cizing the employer for refusing to hire a diabetic based on general beliefs and misconcep-
tions about the risks the employee might have posed as a diabetic).
126. Id. at 472.
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cose (i.e., Rodriguez had diabetes). Because Rodriguez could not re-
member on the spot the name of his treating physician or the name of the
medication he was taking to control his diabetes, the doctor concluded
that it was "uncontrolled.' 1 27 Rodriguez immediately disagreed; he pro-
tested that he had just had a complete physical two months earlier, which
found him in good health, and that his condition was fully controlled by
medication and never caused him any trouble. 128 Still, the company doc-
tor reported to ConAgra that Rodriguez was "not medically qualified"
for the position because of "uncontrolled diabetes." 129 Without further
investigation, the Human Resources Manager rescinded Rodriguez's job
offer based on a company policy of rejecting all applicants with uncon-
trolled diabetes.' 30
The Fifth Circuit ruled that Rodriguez's case fell squarely under the
"regarded-as" prong of chapter 21's definition of disability. 1 3  At the
time ConAgra withdrew his job offer, Rodriguez's diabetes did not actu-
ally substantially limit him in a major life activity, yet ConAgra nonethe-
less perceived his condition as substantially limiting. 132 Moreover,
ConAgra admitted that it considered Rodriguez unable to work in a
broad class of jobs by answering "no" to an interrogatory that asked,
"Was Plaintiff qualified for any other positions at ConAgra Foods?" 133
ConAgra argued that it did not refuse to hire Rodriguez because of his
diabetes; it refused to hire him because he did not control his diabetes.
The Fifth Circuit scoffed, calling ConAgra's argument an "overbroad
generalization [that] widely misses the mark":
ConAgra's argument that Rodriguez's "failure to control" his diabe-
tes obviates the protection of the ADA is a red herring. This case is
not about "failure to control"; rather, it is a garden variety "regarded
as disabled" case. In such cases, the question of control is never rele-
vant: Any rule requiring that a plaintiff exercise some level of con-
trol over his impairment-assuming arguendo that such a rule even
exists134-is relevant and applies only in an actual disability case. 135
The Fifth Circuit reminded employers that chapter 21 requires an em-
ployer to make an individualized assessment of whether "the particular
applicant before it is actually substantially limited by his impairment and




130. Id. at 472, 475.
131. Id. at 475.
132. Id. at 474-75.
133. Id. at 477.
134. The Fifth Circuit did not reach the issue of whether chapter 21 imposes a duty on
impaired persons to use available mitigating measures to control their impairments. In
merely noted that the existence of such a "failure to control" rule "is a thorny and conten-
tious issue." Id. at 478 n.34.
135. Id. at 475.
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functions of the job at issue."'136 The problem with ConAgra's decision to
withdraw Rodriguez's job offer was that it was not based on the kind of
"individualized and fact-intensive assessment envisioned by the
ADA."'1 37 Instead, the doctor and the human resource manager based
their decision on stereotypes and generalizations about diabetics:
At its core, this case is about the TCHRA/ADA's emphasis on treat-
ing impaired job applicants as individuals. ConAgra's blanket policy
of refusing to hire what it characterizes as "uncontrolled" diabetics
violates this fundamental tenet of ADA law; it embraces what the
ADA detests: reliance on "stereotypes and generalizations" about an
illness when making employment decisions. 138
Whether an employer's good faith yet mistaken belief that a job appli-
cant is noncompliant with measures to mitigate an otherwise potentially
disabling impairment constitutes a defense to a claim of "regarded-as"
disability discrimination remains an open question. The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded, as a matter of law evidently, that ConAgra's belief about Rodri-
guez's efforts to control his diabetes were not held in good faith, even
though there was no evidence offered that ConAgra had any reason to
question the doctor's conclusion. 139 Under the ADA and chapter 21, an
employer may not, in the Fifth Circuit's apparent view, rely uncondition-
ally on disqualifying medical information, at least when it comes from a
company-paid doctor.140
D. FMLA
1. De Minimis Job Changes
The Fifth Circuit held that minor changes in a job or job duties do not
violate an employee's right to restoration under the FMLA.141 A school
accountant returned from FMLA leave to discover that the School Board
had tinkered with her job description and duties during her absence. Her
salary was unchanged, and her duties still involved accounting, but she
was no longer responsible for traveling to various schools to provide
bookkeeping training and support. Instead, she was now confined to a
single office from which she performed all her auditing functions. The
Fifth Circuit was unmoved: "[T]hese sorts of de minimis, intangible dif-
ferences do not give rise to FMLA liability. '"142
136. Id. at 481.
137. Id. at 482.
138. Id. at 475. For a case where the employer's concerns about the risk posed by a
diabetic employee were not based on fear, conjecture, or stereotyping, see Burden v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., No. 5:04-CV-159-C, 2005 WL 2444622, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 3,
2005). In Burden, the employer made an individualized assessment that the diabetic em-
ployee was not qualified for positions that required driving, based on the employee's
demonstrated history of dangerous, hypoglycemic incidents. Id. at *7.
139. Rodriguez, 436 F.3d at 478-79.
140. Id. at 481.




2. Involuntary FMLA Leave
Litigants have battled since the 1993 enactment of the FMLA over
what constitutes sufficient notice from an employee of a "serious health
condition" to trigger the employee's right to FMLA leave. 143 Last year,
the Fifth Circuit considered a case that involved an unusual twist: it was
the employer who required the employee to take leave until she could
obtain a medical release. Even though she never notified the employer
that she was suffering from a serious health condition, the employee later
argued that the employer-mandated leave was the equivalent of involun-
tary FMLA leave.'44 Her argument spawned a novel question: for the
employee's employment to be protected by the FMLA when the em-
ployer mandates leave, must the employee provide notice of a "serious
health condition?"1 45 The Fifth Circuit said "yes.' 1 46 Even in the case of
involuntary leave, the employee must provide sufficient notice to her em-
ployer of the need for FMLA-qualifying leave to convert her involuntary
leave into involuntary FMLA leave. 147 In the case before the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the employee did not give her employer any notice that she was
suffering from a serious health condition (even though the employer al-
ready knew she had a "medical problem"), so the involuntary leave the
employer placed her on was not FMLA-protected. Consequently, her
FMLA claim failed. 148
3. Intermittent FMLA Leave & FMLA Retaliation
The FMLA does not entitle an employee with diarrhea to unfettered
permission to take necessary bathroom breaks. 149 Nor does the FMLA
require an employer to halt discharge proceedings the moment the em-
ployee requests FMLA leave.150 Those two holdings arose from a Fifth
Circuit case in which an employee was already well on his way to losing
his job before he requested intermittent FMLA leave. The company
"was not required to suspend [the employee's] termination pending his
FMLA filing."' 51
143. See, e.g., Burnett v. LFW, Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 480 (7th Cir. 2006); Cruz v. Publix
Super Mkts., Inc., 428 F.3d 1379, 1385 (11th Cir. 2005); Walton v. Ford Motor Co., 424 F.3d
481, 486 (6th Cir. 2005); Satterfield v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 973, 982-83 (5th Cir.
1998); Carter v. Ford Motor Co., 121 F.3d 1146, 1148 (8th Cir. 1997) (all adjudicating dis-
putes over whether an employee provided adequate notice of his or her need for FMLA
leave).
144. Willis v. Coca Cola Enters., Inc., 445 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
the case defied "the conventional pattern for FMLA claims" because the employee did not
request FMLA leave, rather, she was placed on "involuntary leave" when her supervisor
refused to permit her to return to work until she could provide a medical release).
145. Id. ("We therefore must consider a novel question for this circuit: what consti-
tutes involuntary FMLA leave and what are the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to
this type of leave.").
146. Id. at 417-18.
147. Id. at 418-19.
148. Id. at 419.
149. Mauder v. Metro. Transit Auth., 446 F.3d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 2006).





In Lubke v. City of Arlington,152 the Fifth Circuit upheld a jury verdict
in favor of a former firefighter on his claim that he was discharged in
violation of the FMLA but overturned the jury's substantial monetary
award. 153 A jury found that the City of Arlington ("City") violated the
FMLA when it discharged Kim Lubke, who had disregarded the City's
absenteeism policy over the Y2K weekend so that he could stay home
and care for his wife. 154 The trial court ruled that Lubke was not re-
quired to provide medical certification of his need for FMLA leave be-
cause the City had not properly requested it.155 On appeal, the City
argued that the district court's ruling impermissibly afforded Lubke an
FMLA remedy to which he was not otherwise entitled. The City based its
contention on a United States Supreme Court case, Ragsdale v. Wolverine
World Wide, Inc. ,156 which held that an employee must prove that he was
actually prejudiced as a result of any technical noncompliance by his
employer.157
According to the City, Ragsdale meant that Lubke had to prove that he
was actually prejudiced by the City's technical noncompliance with the
procedures for requesting medical certification.1 58 The Fifth Circuit ap-
peared to agree that the district court should have required Lubke to
show prejudice.1 59 But the district court's mistake was not harmful, the
Fifth Circuit reasoned, because Lubke could have proved prejudice if the
district court had required him to (although the Court did not address the
fact that because the trial judge granted judgment as a matter of law to
the plaintiff on this issue, Lubke did not, in fact, have to prove
prejudice). 160 Specifically, Lubke had evidence that if the City had told
him what type of medical certification it wanted, he could have submitted
doctors' reports proving his wife had a serious medical condition, and he
would not have been discharged.1 61 "On the record as a whole, assuming
152. 455 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2006).
153. Id. at 500 (affirming as to liability but remanding for a recalculation of damages),
reh'g denied per curiam by 473 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). In denying the City's
petition for rehearing, the Fifth Circuit directed the district court to consider the City's
judicial-estoppel arguments based on the City's discovery that during the pendency of the
appeal, the plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy and failed to disclose his judgment or claim
against the City as an asset. Id. at 571.
154. Lubke, 455 F.3d at 493-94 (relating that a ten-day jury trial resulted in a verdict for
the firefighter on his FMLA claim against the City).
155. Id. at 496.
156. 535 U.S. 81 (2002) (requiring employees to demonstrate that the employer's tech-
nical non-compliance caused some "real impairment of their rights and resulting
prejudice").
157. Id. at 82, 90-91.
158. Lubke, 455 F.3d at 497-98 (applying Ragsdale, 535 U.S. 81 (2002)).
159. Id. (explaining that Ragsdale meant that the district court could not excuse the
firefighter's failure to provide notice if doing so would afford the firefighter an FMLA
remedy to which he was not otherwise entitled; absent such entitlement, the firefighter
could not demonstrate prejudice from the City's defective notice).




the district court's ruling was erroneous, it did not deprive the City of its
entitlement to medical substantiation,... and it did not confer on Lubke
greater rights than those afforded by FMLA."'1 62
5. Serious Health Condition
In Lubke, the Fifth Circuit also considered what evidence is enough to
establish a chronic serious health condition under the FMLA.163 Lubke
presented extensive evidence at trial regarding his wife's chronic back
problems, including testimony and documentation that her doctor had
treated Mrs. Lubke's back condition for nearly a decade, during which he
prescribed forty medications, including muscle relaxers, anti-inflammato-
ries, sleep medication, and narcotic pain medications. The Fifth Circuit
concluded that the evidence was sufficient, rejecting the City's argument
that Lubke needed expert medical testimony, which he could not provide
owing to the district court's ruling excluding such testimony because of
Lubke's discovery violations. 164 "While we agree that the existence of an
FMLA-covered serious health condition will often necessitate confirma-
tion by means of an expert medical diagnosis, the testimony just men-
tioned allowed the jury reasonably to infer that Mrs. Lubke indeed
suffered from recurring, chronic back pain as defined by this regula-
tion.' '165 The Fifth Circuit likewise rejected the City's argument that ex-
pert testimony was necessary to demonstrate that Mrs. Lubke's health
condition was incapacitating. 166
6. FMLA Damages
Lubke also contains two rulings about the proper measure of damages
in an FMLA case. First, the Fifth Circuit addressed how to calculate
damages for lost insurance benefits. The Fifth Circuit held that its deci-
sions under the ADEA should apply to the FMLA because "the remedies
available under the ADEA and the FMLA both track the FLSA, [and
thus] cases interpreting remedies under the statutes should be consis-
tent."'1 67 Applying its ADEA caselaw, the Fifth Circuit ruled that a dis-
charged employee may recover either (1) "the actual replacement cost for
the insurance" or (2) "the expenses actually incurred that would have
been covered under [the employer's] former insurance plan. ' 168 But the
employee may not recover the plaintiff's preferred measure: the "value"
of the lost insurance. 169
162. Id.




167. Id. at 499.
168. Id.




Second, the Fifth Circuit considered whether "[a]n employer's portion
of retirement and other payments made to a terminated employee must
be deducted from an award of lost wages and benefits .... -170 Again
applying ADEA caselaw, the Fifth Circuit held that the portion of any
retirement payments attributable to the employer must be deducted, re-
jecting Lubke's argument to the contrary based on the collateral-source
rule. 171 Because the district court had applied the incorrect measure in
both areas, the Fifth Circuit remanded for a retrial or recalculation of
damages.172
7. FMLA Estoppel
A case out of the Northern District of Texas should make human re-
sources personnel even more nervous when processing an employee's re-
quest for FMLA leave. In Morgan v. The Neiman-Marcus Group,173 the
district court ruled that if an employer mistakenly tells an employee that
she is qualified for FMLA leave and the employee relies on that misstate-
ment, the employer may be estopped from later arguing in court that the
employee was not eligible. 174
E. ERISA
1. ERISA Estoppel
The Fifth Circuit joined other circuits in "explicitly adopting estoppel
as a cognizable theory" in ERISA cases.175 But that victory was short-
lived for the plaintiff, who argued that Sara Lee Corp. should be es-
topped from correcting a clerical error that dramatically reduced the
amount of his pension benefits because he had made retirement plans
relying on the company's misrepresentations about the amount of his
pension.176 The Fifth Circuit held that to establish estoppel, the plaintiff
had to show reasonable reliance. 17 7 The Fifth Circuit then pronounced it
unreasonable to rely on "informal benefit statements and oral representa-
tions" that are contrary to the formal terms of the plan. 178 Accordingly,
the Fifth Circuit reversed a judgment in the plaintiff's favor.' 79
2. Scope of Discovery
In the absence of guidance from the Fifth Circuit, courts continue to
debate the appropriate scope of discovery in ERISA cases. For a self-
170. Id.
171. Id. at 499-500.
172. Id. at 500.
173. No. 3:05-CV-0079-G, 2005 WL 3500314 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2005).
174. Id. at *5.
175. Mello v. Sara Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 2005) ("We now join other
circuits in explicitly adopting ERISA-estoppel as a cognizable theory.").
176. Id. at 442-43.
177. Id. at 444.




described "vigorous and principled analysis adding fresh perspective" to
that debate, practitioners can turn to Harris v. J.B. Hunt Transport,
Inc.' 80 After an in-depth review of competing authorities, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas concluded that a
claimant in an ERISA case may conduct discovery into the degree of a
plan administrator's conflict of interest, even though that would mean a
departure from the general rule that discovery in an ERISA case is lim-




In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
two meat-packing companies were required to pay their workers for the
time it took them to walk to their stations after they had changed into
protective clothing and donned safety equipment. 182 The Court also held,
however, that the companies did not have to pay their workers for time
spent waiting in line to don the protective gear.183
The Court's decision is one example of how questions about compensa-
tion for pre- and post-shift work are emerging again after a long period of
dormancy following the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1974.184
For example, in the Southern District of Texas, the Mexican American
Legal Defense and Education Fund sued an employer on behalf of sev-
enty-eight Latino, assembly-line workers, seeking compensation for off-
the-clock work.' 85 The workers had "extensive evidence that they
worked before their shifts and during their lunch breaks" without pay.186
For instance, the workers had proof that supervisors singled out employ-
ees and ordered them to clean the bathrooms or perform other janitorial
chores off-the-clock. 87 The district court ruled that the workers were
entitled to a jury trial. 188
2. Overtime
In Belt v. EmCare, Inc.,189 a group of eighty physician assistants and
nurse practitioners sued their employer under the FLSA alleging a failure
180. 423 F. Supp. 2d 595, 599 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
181. Id. at 601-03.
182. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 28 (2005) (holding that any walking time that
occurs after the employee changes into her protective work clothing and safety equipment
is covered by the FLSA).
183. Id. at 36 (holding that the Portal-to-Portal Act excludes from the FLSA's scope the
time employees spend waiting to don the first piece of gear that marks the beginning of the
workday).
184. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (2006).
185. Colindres v. QuietFlex Mfg., 427 F. Supp. 2d 737, 739-40 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
186. Id. at 757.
187. Id. at 755-56.
188. Id. at 740 (denying the parties' summary-judgment motions).
189. 444 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2006).
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to pay them the required time-and-a-half premium for overtime hours
worked. The employer responded that it did not owe any overtime pay
because the plaintiffs were exempt "bona fide professionals."1 90 The De-
partment of Labor, as amicus curiae, weighed in on the side of the plain-
tiffs and helped score a victory on their behalf.19' The Fifth Circuit held
that the physician assistants and nurse practitioners are not "engaged in
the practice of medicine" so as to qualify for the bona fide professional
exemption. 192
3. FLSA Retaliation
A case out of the Northern District of Texas should make employers
think twice about discharging employees for complaining about their
compensation. In Kerr v. Digital Witness, LLC,193 a judge ruled that an
employee's internal complaint about his wages may qualify as protected
activity under the FLSA. 194 The employer in that case fired one of its
sales employees because he "complained too much about the changes in
compensation and.., his complaining was affecting other sales represent-
atives' attitudes."'195 Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the
Fifth Circuit has weighed in on whether an employee's internal complaint
about his wages satisfies the requirement of the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision, which provides that an employee must have "filed a[ ] com-
plaint"; the other circuit courts are split.196 Faced with that uncertainty,
this Texas district court followed the majority of circuits and applied the
rule that internal complaints to the employer can satisfy the FLSA's
"file[d] a[ I complaint" requirement. 97 Not all "abstract grumblings" will
be sufficient, the court cautioned.' 98 But in this case, the salesman's com-
plaints about his compensation could be specific enough to qualify as pro-
tected activity.' 99
G. OSHA 200
In a case of first impression for the circuit, the Fifth Circuit made it
more difficult for the government to prove that an employer knowingly
190. Id. at 406 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)( 1) (2006)) (exempting any employee em-
ployed in a bona fide professional capacity from the FLSA's overtime requirements).
191. Id. at 405.
192. Belt, 444 F.3d at 417 (deferring to the Department of Labor's opinion that the
plaintiffs did not qualify for the exemption for bona fide professionals).
193. No. 3:05-CV-1580-G, 2005 WL 3274062 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2005).
194. Id. at *3 (holding that "internal complaints to the employer may satisfy the com-
plaint requirement of the FLSA").
195. Id. at *1.
196. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)( 3) (stating the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision); Kerr, 2005
WL 3274062, at *3 (lamenting the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court and Fifth
Circuit and describing precedent from other circuit courts).
197. Kerr, 2005 WL 3274062, at *3.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *4 (refusing to dismiss the employee's FLSA retaliation claim because it was
not certain that the salesman's complaints did not constitute protected activity).
200. Occupational Safety & Health Act.
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violated OSHA based on the malfeasance of a supervisory employee. 20 1
The question was whether a supervisor's knowledge of his own wrongdo-
ing is imputed to the employer to the same extent as the supervisor's
knowledge of somebody else's misconduct. The Fifth Circuit held that "a
supervisor's knowledge of his own malfeasance is not imputable to the
employer where the employer's safety policy, training, and discipline are
sufficient to make the supervisor's conduct in violation of the policy
unforeseeable." 20 2
IV. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
The United States Supreme Court issued a groundbreaking opinion on
the issue of public employees' First Amendment rights. 20 3 The Court
ruled that "when public employees make statements pursuant to their of-
ficial duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amend-
ment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline. ' 20 4 Thus, a deputy district at-
torney could be disciplined for writing a disposition memorandum in
which he recommended dismissal of a case on the basis of purported gov-
ernmental misconduct because he wrote the memorandum pursuant to
his official duties.20 5 Garcetti no doubt will have a significant impact on
First Amendment retaliation litigation in the public-employment context.
Rather than focusing immediately on whether the speech at issue in-
volved a matter of public concern, 20 6 courts will now have to determine
first whether the speech was made as a citizen or pursuant to an em-
ployee's official duties.
A. TEXAS STATE-LAw DEVELOPMENTS
1. At-will Employment
a. Contractual Limitations
The Texas Supreme Court continued to defend the state's long adher-
ence to the presumption of at-will employment. In Matagorda County
Hospital District v. Burwell,20 7 the employee tried, as many have before
her, to base a breach-of-contract claim on language from an employee
201. W.G. Yates & Sons Constr. Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 459 F.3d 604, 607 (5th Cir. 2006).
202. Id. at 608-09 (emphasis in original).
203. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
204. Id. at 1960.
205. Id. at 1961 ("Proper application of our precedents thus leads to the conclusion that
the First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee's ex-
pressions made pursuant to official responsibilities. Because [the attorney's] memo falls
into this category, his allegation of unconstitutional retaliation must fail.").
206. Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174, 180-81 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying the public-concern
test).
207. 189 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. 2006) ("For well over a century, the general rule in this State,
as in most American jurisdictions, has been that absent a specific agreement to the con-
trary, employment may be terminated by the employer or the employee at will, for good
cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.").
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handbook. Also like many before her, she failed. The supreme court
ruled that a statement in a personnel policy manual that "employees may
be dismissed for cause" did not constitute an agreement that dismissal
may be only for cause. 2° 8 The supreme court also held that another pro-
vision in the manual-stating the employer's policy of requiring em-
ployee records to list one of several bases for discharge-did not create a
specific agreement to alter the employee's at-will status.20 9
In another breach-of-contract case, a Texas man was able to substanti-
ate the frequently alleged, but rarely proven, claim that his employer
made an oral modification to his at-will employment contract. 210 Specifi-
cally, the man proved that the company's safety director expressly agreed
to a clear and specific limitation on the company's right to fire him: he
would not be fired for implementing unpopular measures to bring the
company into compliance with safety laws.2 11 When the safety director's
promise turned out to be empty, the man filed suit in Texas state court
and recovered actual damages of $105,000.212
b. Common-law Limitations on At-will Employment
An exasperated Texas Supreme Court refused, for a third time, to cre-
ate a common-law whistleblower cause of action.
Twice in recent years this Court has rejected invitations to create a
common-law cause of action for all whistleblowers, noting each time
that a general claim would eclipse the Legislature's decision to enact
a number of narrowly-tailored whistleblower statutes instead. For
the same reason, we reach the same result today.2 13
A ranch hand asserted that'his employer fired him solely because he was
trying to find out what had happened to three illegal immigrants who had
been apprehended by the ranch foreman. The ranch hand argued that his
boss's instruction to "drop it" was an attempt to include him "in a con-
spiracy to cover up criminal and illegal conduct involving any Mexican
National on the Ranch. '2 14 The Texas Supreme Court found that the
ranch hand's facts could not support a whistleblower claim under the ex-
isting case law and refused to create a common-law cause of action that
would cover his situation.215 The court thought it "best to defer to the
208. Id.
209. Id. at 739-40.
210. For an example of a typical failed claim involving an alleged modification to an
employee's at-will employment, see Talford v. Columbia Med. Ctr., 198 S.W.3d 462, 465
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). In Talford, the court of appeals ruled that statements
that an employee was hired "for a permanent job for the rest of [her] working career" and
that her requested transfer had been approved were not unequivocal indications by the
employer of a definite intention to be bound not to terminate the employee except under
clearly specified circumstances. Talford, 198 S.W.3d at 465.
211. El Expresso, Inc. v. Zendejas, 193 S.W.3d 590, 593-95 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
212. Id. at 592.
213. Ed Rachal Found. v. D'Unger, 207 S.W.3d 330, 331 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 333.
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Legislature's extensive efforts and greater flexibility in balancing compet-
ing interests and crafting remedies for retaliation by employers. '216
2. Compensation Disputes
A Texas employer faced litigation over whether it changed its employ-
ees' wage rates without proof that it first informed each employee that it
was doing So. 2 1 7 The employer and employee argued at some length
about whether certain employee handouts and postings served to notify
the employee about the upcoming wage change. The bottom line for the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, however,
was that the employer could not merely make its pay policies available to
its employees. To provide effective notice of the wage change-and
thereby allow acceptance simply by the employees' continued employ-
ment-the employer must actively and expressly notify each individual
employee of the change. 21 8
In another dispute over compensation, the Dallas Court of Appeals
held that a former employee did not have an enforceable oral contract for
payment of a bonus because the amount of the bonus was indefinite at
the time of the agreement and was open for future negotiation or exercise
of employer discretion.2 19
3. Workers' Compensation Discrimination
Chapter 451 of the Texas Labor Code prohibits discriminating against
employees who make claims or participate in certain proceedings under
the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.220 The Beaumont Court of Ap-
peals ruled that a wife did not engage in protected activity under chapter
451 when she appeared and participated at a benefit-review conference at
which her spouse, who worked for the same company, obtained workers'
compensation benefits.221 Because a benefit-review conference is not a
hearing of record and the review officer is prohibited from taking testi-
mony, the court reasoned that the wife technically had not "testified" or
been "about to testify" as required to be protected.2 22 The dissenting
judge criticized the majority's interpretation as hypertechnical, which he
saw as contrary to chapter 451's intended purpose of providing broad
protection for employees who participate in workers' compensation
proceedings.223
216. Id. (internal citations omitted).
217. Conner v. Celanese, Ltd., 428 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (finding a fact
issue as to whether the employer changed the employee's pay rate without the employee's
knowledge).
218. Id. (denying summary judgment on the employee's breach-of-contract claim).
219. Shaw v. Palmer, 197 S.W.3d 854, 856-57 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
220. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 451.001 (Vernon 2006).
221. Griggs v. Triple S Indus. Corp., 197 S.W.3d 408, 411-13 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2006, pet. filed).
222. Id. at 411.




Fearing liability for giving employment references, many employers
have adopted tight-lipped policies under which they will confirm only the
employee's position and dates of employment. A ruling from the Waco
Court of Appeals shows that the fear is not unfounded. In Johnson v.
Baylor University,2 24 the court held that an employer owes a former em-
ployee "a duty to exercise reasonable care" when providing an employ-
ment reference to a prospective employer.22 5 As a result, the employer
could be liable for negligent misrepresentation if it incorrectly reported
to a prospective employer that the plaintiff was fired for misconduct and
thereby caused the prospective employer not to hire the plaintiff.226
5. Statute of Limitations
An employer used an uncommon tool to reduce its exposure to em-
ployment litigation in Vincent v. Comerica Bank.227 Its job application
included the following provision:
I agree that if I am employed ... that in partial consideration for my
employment, I shall not commence any action or other legal pro-
ceeding relating to my employment or the termination thereof more
than six months after the event complained of and agree to waive
any statute of limitations to the contrary.228
The employer later used that provision to argue that a bank teller's defa-
mation claim was time-barred. The judge enforced the parties' contrac-
tual agreement to abbreviate the limitations period. 229 It ruled that the
bank teller's defamation claim was untimely because she did not file suit
until more than six months after the bank's alleged defamatory state-
ments. 230 In reaching that conclusion, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas rejected the bank teller's arguments
that the limitations provision was unenforceable because (1) it was void
under Texas statutory law, and (2) it was not supported by adequate
consideration.2 31
6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Before the Texas Supreme Court decided Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v.
Zeltwanger,2 32 it was rare to see a chapter 21 or Title VII lawsuit without
an add-on claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Hoff-
man-LaRoche, the Texas Supreme Court scotched that practice by hold-
ing that "if the gravamen of a plaintiff's complaint is the type of wrong
224. 188 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).
225. Id. at 303.
226. Id. at 306.
227. No. H-05-2302, 2006 WL 1295494, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 10, 2006).
228. Id. at *4.
229. Id. at *6.
230. Id.
231. Id. at *5.
232. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. 2004).
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that the statutory remedy was meant to cover, a plaintiff cannot maintain
an intentional infliction claim regardless of whether he or she succeeds
on, or even makes, a statutory claim. '233 During the Survey period,
courts regularly used Hoffman-LaRoche to dismiss intentional infliction
claims that did nothing more than re-package a statutory discrimination
claim.234 In Texas, therefore, the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress is on its deathbed in the employment context. But it still
has a pulse: courts are split on whether intentional-infliction claims re-
main viable against individual supervisors when the claims are based on
the same conduct asserted to support the plaintiff's statutory discrimina-
tion claim against the employer. 235
V. CONCLUSION
An area of future concern is re-employment rights of returning reserv-
ists. The Department of Labor estimates that since the start of hostilities
in Iraq, more than 390,000 soldiers have been released from active duty
to return to their regular civilian jobs.236 The recent surge in troops
posted to Iraq will only increase that number.2 37 Employers thus will
continue to face the challenge of first replacing members of the armed
services and then restoring them to employment. To meet that challenge,
employers must be aware of their obligations under USERRA.2 38 To of-
fer employers guidance, the Department of Labor issued final USERRA
regulations, which became effective January 18, 2006.239 The Department
of Labor hoped that the new regulations would reduce the number of
USERRA complaints (the agency reasoned that most USERRA viola-
tions were caused by a lack of understanding of the Act).240 Yet
USERRA claims actually increased after the regulations were issued-by
233. Id. at 450.
234. See, e.g., Swafford v. Bank of Am. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 761, 764 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(dismissing the plaintiff's intentional infliction claim because the gravamen of her claim
was age discrimination, and she invoked the same evidence to show discrimination and a
hostile work environment that she relied on to show intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Pool v. U.S. Investigative Servs., Inc., No. 3:04-CV-2332-M, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31928, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2005) ("Plaintiff bases her intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim on precisely the same set of facts upon which she bases her retalia-
tion claim. As chapter 21 provides a method of recovery for the damages Plaintiff seeks,
her intentional infliction claim is inappropriate here.").
235. Compare Dixon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Cos., 433 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789 (N.D.
Tex. 2006), with Swafford v. Bank of Am. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 761, 764 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
236. Elaine L. Chao, U.S. Secretary of Labor, USERRA Regulations Rollout Press
Conference, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 16, 2005) (available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/
speeches/20051216_- userra.htm).
237. President George W. Bush, President's Address to the Nation (Jan. 10, 2007) (an-
nouncing that he had committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq)
(available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html).
238. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4334.
239. 20 C.F.R. § 1002 (setting out the final administrative regulations interpreting
USERRA).
240. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2004 120
(2005) (available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/annual2004/annualreport.pdf).
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ten percent during 2006-resuming a trend that started after 9/11.241 The
DOL attributes part of the uptick in claims to the agency's new electronic
form that permits online filing.242 Practitioners can expect to see an in-
crease in USERRA litigation as some of those complaints inevitably es-
calate to litigation.
241. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2006 (2007)
(available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/annual2006/SG3.htm).
242. Id. ("Contributing to the increase in claims was introduction of a new electronic
form that enabled claimants to file USERRA claims via the Internet.").
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